“Speak with data…” is a saying in research and engineering that reinforces the need for data to support any position, conclusion or recommendation. Clearly, substantiating data is essential to making a case for financial support, policy changes and code and legislative changes, changes that are an ongoing concern for the fire service in our quest for a safer community.

The National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) program has been the key fire service data collection mechanism for nearly 40 years. The genesis of the reporting system was the publication of *America Burning* report produced by the National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control in 1973. This report provided the catalyst for Public Law 93–498, the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974. In turn, that law led to the establishment of the U.S. Fire Administration and the National Fire Academy. During some of my graduate work, I did a paper on this law and found the roots and beginnings dating back to the Kennedy Administration.

The *American Burning* transmittal letter and introduction included a number of critical, forward looking statements about data being a vehicle for change:

- The Commission worked in a field where statistics are meager. In other words, we knew we had a problem, but we had no tools to analyze it.
- Develop a comprehensive national fire data system, which will help establish priorities for research and action.
- If these efforts are carried out, we predict a 5% reduction in fire losses annually until the Nation’s losses have been halved in about 14 years.

The recommendations emphasize prevention of fire through implementation of local programs.

Over its almost 40 year history, the data collected through NFIRS has resulted in remarkable improvements to fire safety, achieving the goal of cutting the nation’s fire losses in half. But there is so much more to learn; every fire has a story to tell.

It is vital to include every bit of that story in a central database that can be searched for information and statistics critical to preventing the next fire, helping occupants deal with a fire or helping the fire service to possess the proper tools for dealing with a fire. Today more than ever, the NFIRS database is utilized by many agencies and researchers to explore opportunities for enhancing fire protection. Unfortunately,
the search for data can often be frustrating because the forms are incomplete or contain bad data. Perhaps the individual completing the report hasn’t been properly trained or the task is assigned to the low man on the totem pole. Another reason often sited is change appears to happen painfully slowly and it’s not worth the effort.

Regardless of the reason, the fire service and the people we’re sworn to protect are the big losers. Proper and complete completion of the NFIRS form is vital to the mission and is the key to working for a fire safe America.

As a Golden Firefighter or Officer, an important part of your job is to enhance fire safety, and this means ongoing improvement. Changes are made based on data. I would ask that every officer, firefighter, and staff member who complete NFIRS to help make the fire service and those we serve safer by stressing the importance of properly completing the NFIRS report and spend the time to train the new guy how to do it correctly. We have a great reporting system that we have been using for over one year, but it is only as good as the data we put into each and every report. This data is vital for a safer tomorrow.

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**Birthdays & Anniversaries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anniversaries</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>22 Years</strong></td>
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August 5 marked the 64 years since the Mann Gulch Fire. The story of Young Men and Fire will remain timeless until we learn and apply the lessons of such recurring tragedies. Below is a tribute video of the Mann Gulch Fire as well as a full length story of what happened.

Cold Missouri Waters - Cry Cry Cry

The Mann Gulch fire was a wildfire reported on August 5, 1949 in a gulch located along the upper Missouri River in the Gates of the Mountains Wilderness, Helena National Forest, Montana. A team of 15 smokejumpers parachuted into the area on the afternoon of August 5, 1949 to fight the fire, rendezvousing with a former smokejumper who was employed as a fire guard at the nearby campground. As the team approached the fire to begin fighting it, unexpected high winds caused the fire to suddenly expand, cutting off the men's route and forcing them back uphill. During the next few minutes, a "blow-up" of the fire covered 3,000 acres (1,200 ha) in ten minutes, claiming the lives of 13 firefighters, including 12 of the smokejumpers. Three of the smokejumpers survived. The fire would continue for five more days before being controlled.

The United States Forest Service drew lessons from the tragedy of the Mann Gulch fire by designing new training techniques and safety measures that developed how the agency approached wildfire suppression. The agency also increased emphasis on fire research and the science of fire behavior.

University of Chicago English professor and author Norman Maclean (1902–1990) researched the fire and its behavior for his book, Young Men and Fire (1992) which was published after his death. Maclean, who worked in northwestern Montana in logging camps and for the forest service in his youth, recounted the events of the fire and ensuing tragedy and undertook a detailed investigation of the fire's causes. Young Men and Fire won the National Book Critics Circle Award for non-fiction in 1992. The 1952 film, Red Skies of Montana starring actor Richard Widmark and directed by Joseph M. Newman was loosely based on the events of the Mann Gulch fire.

The location of the Mann Gulch fire was included as a historical district on the United States National Register of Historic Places on May 19, 1999.
Sequence of events

The fire started when lightning struck the south side of Mann Gulch, in an area named by Lewis and Clark in the Gates of the Mountains Wilderness. The fire was spotted by a forest ranger around noon on August 5, 1949. James O. Harrison, the recreation and fire prevention guard for Meriwether Canyon Campground, had given up his former job as a smokejumper to find a less dangerous profession. On this day, however, he fought the fire on his own for four hours before he met the crew of smokejumpers who had been dispatched from Hale Field, Missoula, Montana, in a C-47.

It was hot, with a temperature of 97 °F, and the fire danger rating was high, rated 74 out of a possible 100. Wind conditions that day were turbulent. One smokejumper got sick on the way and did not jump, returning with the airplane to Hale Field. Getting off the plane he resigned from the smokejumpers. In all, 15 smokejumpers parachuted into the fire. Their radio was destroyed during the jump, after its parachute failed to open, while other gear and individual jumpers were scattered widely due to the conditions. After the smokejumpers had landed a shout was heard coming from the front of the fire. Foreman Wagner Dodge went ahead to find the person shouting and to scout the fire. He left instructions for the team to finish gathering their equipment and eat, then cross the gully to the south slope and advance to the front of the fire. The voice turned out to be Jim Harrison, who had been fighting the fire by himself for the past four hours.

The two headed back, Dodge noting that you could not get closer to within 100 feet of the fire due to the heat. The crew met Dodge and Harrison about half way to the fire. Dodge instructed the team to move off the front of the fire and down the gully, crossing back over to the thinly forested and grass covered north slope of the gulch, "sidehilling" (keeping the same contour or elevation) and moving "down gulch" towards the Missouri River. They could then fight the fire from the flank or behind, steering the fire to a low fuel area. Dodge returned with Harrison up the gulch to the supply area, where the two stopped to eat before returning for the all night work of fighting the fire. While there Dodge noticed the smoke along the fire front boiling up, indicating an intensification of the heat of the fire. He and Harrison headed down the gulch to catch up with the crew.

The "Blow Up"

By the time Dodge reached his men, the fire at the bottom of the gulch was already jumping from the high south slope of Mann Gulch to the bottom of the north side of the gulch. As the fire jumped across to the bottom of the north slope the intense heat of the fire combined with wind coming off the river and pushed the flames up gulch into the fast burning north slope grass, causing what fire fighters call a "blow up". The crew could not see the bottom of the gulch, the various side ridges running down the slope obscuring their view, and they initially continued down the side of the ridge. When Dodge finally got a glimpse of what was happening below, he turned the men around and started them angling back up the side of the ridge. Within a couple hundred yards he ordered the men to drop packs and heavy tools (Pulaskis, shovels and crosscut saws):

Dodge's order was to throw away just their packs and heavy tools, but to his surprise some of them had already thrown away all of their heavy equipment. On the other hand, some of them wouldn't abandon their heavy tools, even after Dodge's order. Diettert, one of the most intelligent of the crew, continued carrying both his tools until Rumsey caught up with him, took his shovel and leaned it against a pine tree. Just a little further on, Rumsey and Sallee pass the recreation guard, Jim Harrison, who, having been on the fire all afternoon, was now exhausted. He was sitting with his heavy pack on and was making no effort to take it off.

By this point the fire was moving extremely fast up the 76% north slope (37.23 degree slope) of Mann Gulch and Dodge realized they would not be able to make the ridge line in front of the fire. With the fire (Continued on page 5)
less than a hundred yards behind he took a match out and set fire to the grass just before them. In doing so he was attempting to create an escape fire to lie in so that the main fire would burn around him and his crew. In the back draft of the main fire the grass fire set burned straight up toward the ridge above. Turning to the three men by him, Robert Sallee, Walter Rumsey and Eldon Diettert, Dodge said "Up this way", but the men misunderstood him. The three ran straight up for the ridge crest, moving up along the far edge of Dodge's fire. Sallee later said he wasn't sure what Dodge was doing, and thought perhaps he intended the fire to act as a buffer between the men and the main fire. It was not until he got to the ridge crest and looked back down that he realized what Dodge had intended. As the rest of the crew came up Dodge tried to direct them through the fire he had set and into the center burnt out area. Dodge later stated that someone, possibly squad leader William Hellman, said "To hell with that, I'm getting out of here". The rest of the team raced on past Dodge up the side of the slope toward the hogback of Mann Gulch ridge, hoping they had enough time to get through the rock ridge line and over to safer ground on the other side. None of the men racing up before the fire entered into the escape fire.

Immediate outcome

Four of the men reached the ridge crest, but only two, Bob Sallee and Walter Rumsey, managed to escape through a crevice or deep fissure in the rock ridge to reach the other side. In the dense smoke of the fire the two had no way of knowing if the crevice they found actually "went through" to the other side or would be a blind trap. Diettert had been just to the right, slightly upgulch of Sallee and Rumsey, but he did not drop back to the crevice and continued on up the right side of the hogback. He did not find another escape route and was overtaken by the fire. Sallee and Rumsey came through the hogback to the ridge crest above what became known as Rescue Gulch. Dropping down off the ridge they managed to find a rock slide with little to no vegetation. They waited there for the fire to overtake them, moving from the bottom of the slide to the top as the fire moved past. Hellman was caught by the fire on the top of the ridge and was badly burned. Though he and Joseph Sylvia initially survived the fire, they suffered heavy injuries and both died in hospital the next day. Wag Dodge entered the charred center of the escape fire he had built and survived the intensely burning main fire. Dodge stated the updrafts generated by the fire moving past him were so intense they caused him to be "lifted off the ground" several times. Of those crew members caught in the oxygen demanding main fire, unburnt patches underneath their bodies indicated they had suffocated for lack of air before the fire caught them.

Timing

The events described above all transpired in a very short period of time. Everyone had jumped by around 4:10 p.m. The scattered cargo had been gathered at about 5:00 p.m. At about 5:45 p.m., the crew had seen the fire coming up towards them on the north slope and had turned to run. By four minutes to 6:00 the fire had swept over them. The time at which the fire engulfed the men was judged by the melted hands on Harrison's pocketwatch, forever frozen at 5:56 p.m. by the intense heat. Studies estimated that the fire covered 3,000 acres in 10 minutes during this blow-up stage. An hour and 45 minutes after they arrived. Thirteen firefighters had died, while only three survived.

Casualties

(Continued from page 4)

(Continued on page 6)
Memorial cross marking the spot where smokejumper Joseph B. Sylvia died while fleeing the advancing wildfire—13 memorial markers are located on the steep hillside.

Those that were killed by the fire:
- Robert J. Bennett, age 22, from Paris, Tennessee
- Eldon E. Diettert, age 19, from Moscow, Idaho, died on his 19th birthday
- James O. Harrison, Helena National Forest Fire Guard, age 20, from Missoula, Montana
- William J. Hellman, age 24, from Kalispell, Montana
- Philip R. McVey, age 22, from Babb, Montana
- David R. Navon, age 28, from Modesto, California
- Leonard L. Piper, age 23, from Blairsville, Pennsylvania
- Stanley J. Reba, from Brooklyn, New York
- Marvin L. Sherman, age 21, from Missoula, Montana
- Joseph B. Sylvia, age 24, from Plymouth, Massachusetts
- Henry J. Thol, Jr., age 19, from Kalispell, Montana
- Newton R. Thompson, age 23, from Alhambra, California
- Silas R. Thompson, age 21, from Charlotte, North Carolina

Those that survived:
- R. Wagner (Wag) Dodge, Missoula SJ foreman, age 33 at the time of the fire. Wag died 5 years after the fire from Hodgkin's disease.
- Walter B. Rumsey, age 21 at time of the fire, from Larned, Kansas. Rumsey died in an airplane crash in 1980, age 52.
- Robert W. Sallee, youngest man on the crew, age 17 at time of the fire, from Willow Creek, Montana.

Much controversy surrounded Foreman Dodge and the fire he lit to escape. In answering the questions of (Continued on page 7)
the Forest Service Review Board as to why he took the actions he did, Dodge stated he had never heard of such a fire being set; it had just seemed "logical" to him. In fact, it was not a method that the forest service had considered, nor would it work in the intense heat of the normal tall growth forest fires that they typically fought. Similar types of escape fires had been used by the plains Indians to escape the fast-moving, brief duration grass fires of the plains, and the method had been written about by James Fenimore Cooper (1827) in The Prairie, but in this case Foreman Dodge appears to have invented on the spot, as the only means available to him to save his crew. None of the men realized what it was and only Dodge was saved by it.

Earl Cooley was the spotter/kicker the morning of the August 5, 1949 Mann Gulch fire jump. Cooley was the first Smokejumper to jump on an operational fire jump. The first jump was a two-man jump, and was performed on July 12, 1940. Mr. Cooley was the airborne supervisor who directed the crew of smokejumpers who dropped in to fight the Mann Gulch fire. In the 1950s Mr. Cooley served as the smokejumper base superintendent and was the first president of the National Smokejumper Association. Mr. Cooley, died November 9, 2009 at age 98.

The C-47/DC-3, registration number NC24320, was the only smokejumper plane available at Hale Field, near the current location of Sentinel High School, on August 5, 1949, when the call came in seeking 25 smokejumpers to fight a blaze in a hard-to-reach area of the Helena National Forest. The C-47/DC-3 could hold only 16 jumpers and their equipment. Even though more help was needed, fire bosses decided not to wait for a second plane, and instead sent No. NC24320 out on its own. NC24320 flew with Johnson Flying Service from Hale Field in Missoula, Montana and was used to drop Smokejumpers as well as for other operations for which Johnson Flying Service held contracts. The C-47/DC-3 that carried the smokejumpers that day is on exhibit in Missoula at the Museum of Mountain Flying. The aircraft was restored and now serves as a memorial to the Smokejumpers and the Fire Guard that lost their lives at Mann Gulch on August 5, 1949.

**Aftermath**

![Commemorative sign at Mann Gulch](image)

Four hundred fifty men fought for five more days to get the fire under control, which had spread to 4,500 acres (1,800 ha).

Wagner Dodge survived unharmed and died five years later of Hodgkin's disease.

Thirteen crosses were erected to mark the locations where the thirteen firefighters who died fighting the Mann Gulch Fire fell. However, one of the smokejumpers who died in the Mann Gulch Fire was David Navon, who was Jewish. In 2001 the cross marking the location where Navon died was replaced with a marker bearing a Star of David.

Several months following the fire, fire scientist Harry Gisborne, from the U.S. Forest Service Research Center at Priest River, came to examine the damage. Having a history of heart problems, he nevertheless con-
ducted an on-ground survey of the fire site. He suffered a heart attack and died while finishing the day's research.

Gisborne had forwarded theories as to the cause of the blowup prior to his arrival on site. Once there, he discovered several conditions, which caused him to change his concepts of fire activity, particularly those pertaining to fire "blow-ups". He noted this to his companion just before his death on November 9, 1949.

There was some controversy about the fire, with a few parents of the men trying to sue the government. One charge was that the "escape fire" had actually burned the men.

Lessons learned from the Mann Gulch fire had a great effect on firefighter training. However, some of the lessons were forgotten and the tragedy would be repeated in the South Canyon Fire of 1994, in which 14 firefighters died.

### Contributing factors

Several factors that combined to create the disaster are described in Norman MacLean's book Young Men and Fire.

**Slope** — Fire spreads faster up a slope, and the north slope of Mann Gulch was about a 75% incline. Slope also makes it very difficult to run.

**Fuel** — Fire spreads fast in dry grass. The north slope of Mann Gulch was mostly tall grass that was left ungrazed by nearby ranchers' cattle because the area had been recently designated a wildlife area.

**Leadership** — Dodge did not know most of the crew, as he had been doing base maintenance work during the normal training and "get acquainted" time of the season. This may have contributed to the crew not trusting his "escape fire." Furthermore, Dodge left his crew for several minutes, during which the second-in-command let them spread out instead of staying together.

**Communication** — The crew’s single radio broke because its parachute failed to open. It could have possibly prevented the disaster or helped to get aid more quickly to the two burned men who died later. There were other dangerous fires going on at the same time and Forest Service leaders did not know what was happening on Mann Gulch.

**Weather** — The season was very dry and that day was extremely hot. Winds in the Gulch were also strong "up gulch" the same direction in which the men tried to run.

### NUMBERS FOR JULY 2013

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<th>Hazardous Condition - 10</th>
<th>Mutual Aid Given - 2</th>
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<td>District # 1 - 72</td>
<td>Clear Creek Canyon - 3</td>
<td>Average Response Time - 04:16</td>
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<tr>
<td>District # 2 - 67</td>
<td>Miller Coors Property - 2</td>
<td>Average Firefighters/Call - 6.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fire Response - 4</td>
<td>Out of City/Other - 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rescue/EMS - 74</td>
<td>Mutual Aid Received - 4</td>
<td>Est. Fire/Damage Loss - $8000</td>
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</table>
While I am a bit biased (coming from a primarily engine company background) I am of the belief that the engine company is the backbone of the fire service. Before anyone gets too excited, this is not an attempt to start the age old engine versus truck debate. Every person, tool, and rig serves a critical function on the fireground. That being said, I think we can all agree that without water, hose and a pump we are going to have a difficult time achieving our goal of stabilizing fire related incidents.

Most have probably heard the saying that “the fire goes as the first line goes”. I am a firm believer of this statement having been witness to both successful and less than successful outcomes resulting from critical errors in the initial stretch, placement, and subsequent use of attack lines. With this knowledge I propose to you that in order for us to be effective in meeting our mission, we have to be experts in getting this first hose line into service based on the variable conditions and challenges that we face at every fire we respond to.

So this should be easy. Everything I could ever want to know about firefighting and fire hose can be found in an Essentials Book that sits on our shelves collecting dust. Wrong. Our academy training and JPR Task Books represent the very basics of applying our trade in the real world. I am not discounting their value, in fact if we have not mastered these fundamentals we would be foolish to attempt to apply other techniques.
without a strong foundation based upon this basic knowledge and skill set.

So now come the solutions, because we can pontificate all day long, but if we don’t have a way to solve a problem, we’re a part of it. First step: master the basics. We all know what our strengths and weaknesses are, so if you have skill deficiencies relating to the basics of getting the initial attack line in place, address them. If you don’t know how to address them, come see me and I would be glad (in fact downright ecstatic) to come drop some hose on the ground with you. Once we have established this foundation, we can move on to the fun stuff.

Alright, now fasten your seat belts and put on your thinking caps because this is where the good stuff happens. We’ve practiced pulling our preconnects, flaking our line out, charging it, showing water, checking our patterns (if applicable) and we’ve made it to the seat of the fire consisting of a half a bale of hay and two pallets. We flowed ten gallons of water (to be certain not to put the fire all the way out) and now it’s back out to the unobstructed concrete slab with the 25 foot setback from Engine to the front door for some high fives and Gatorade. While this evolution has intrinsic value, we need to be certain not to mistake it for reality.

So let’s paint a picture of reality. Reality is 0300 hours on a cold winter morning after a long stressful day. Asleep in the bunkroom at Station 21 are three firefighters staffing our first due Engine 21. The call drops and away we go to our “bread and butter” single family dwelling fire. As we arrive we see smoke and fire pushing from the Charlie side of a sprawling ranch single family dwelling and confirm our suspicion of what appears to be a free-burning self-vented room and contents fire. We have a 150 foot setback from the street to the alpha side entrance obstructed by numerous trees, a retaining wall, and a ginormous recreational vehicle. The officer tells the C seat to get the water thief to the front door and then break 100 feet off an 1-3/4” crosslay to connect to the thief for an attack line. Meanwhile the Engineer is hooking up, the Officer is doing his lap, and you are making or break-
SUMMER CLOTHING SALE

SUMMER 2013 SPECIAL
(Good through Labor Day)
Buy TWO items regular price,
get a crew neck sweatshirt FREE !!!
(while supplies last)

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<th>Item</th>
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See Lieutenant Kasriel or Captain Kehoe for sales.

The 4th Annual Safety & Preparedness Day

- Saturday September 14, 2013
- 10 AM-2 PM
- Golden Fire Station #1 911 10th St.

Things to see and do:
- Car seat check station!
- Fire burn safety and preparedness stations!
- Tour a fire truck, ambulance & state patrol crash car!
- Free activity books, safety materials, giveaways & refreshments!
- Drawings for prizes at 10:30, 11:30, 12:30, 1:30
Deployment to the Black Forest Fire

Last month I received a call from the Colorado Fire Chaplains Association and they asked if I would deploy into the Black Forest to be there when families returned to what was left of their houses. Some of you were there and you know the depth of the destruction that took place.

As I went up into one area of the forest, that fire district had assigned a firefighter to each house that had burned down and that firefighter was supposed to meet with the family when they returned and answer any questions they had. At the first house I came to, a young firefighter had just walked with a family around their house that was completely destroyed. The family was visibly and understandably upset as this was their first time back to their house. After the family left I could see this young firefighter was having a hard time also. I asked him if he was here the night it burned down. He told me he was and they had been fighting the fire on the hill above the houses in this area and felt like they were winning when suddenly the wind changed direction. He said it happened so quickly they had to turn and run to their truck and as they pulled away it was so hot that it melted the tarp on the hose bed of the truck. Then he told me what was bothering him. He said “I feel bad that I couldn’t save those little girls house”.

As you sit here reading this you know how close that fire crew came to being hurt or killed when it melted the tarp on their hose bed. It is obvious, looking back, that they made the right decision to get out. But he was feeling guilty for letting the two little girls house burn. We talked about that for a while and he said it himself, finally, that he knows it was the right decision but it was very hard looking at those little girls faces.

I understand his anguish as he looked at those little girls, but I am very glad we weren’t looking at the anguish of a bunch of firefighters and family who just lost one of their own. We value and cherish each and every one of you and please always remember we can replace buildings; we can’t replace you.

You are in my prayers every day.

Chaplain Mark
I just returned from a week in Alaska. Even though I was on vacation, I found it hard to stop doing fire and life safety inspections. My son and I made a game of it while walking through the shops in Seward, Alaska. We did not find one emergency light that functioned in that seaside town. You would think that having almost a thousand inspections to do each year in Golden would give me my fill, but I keep catching myself checking exits and sprinkler systems, noting when FDC’s are missing caps and pushing the test buttons on emergency lights. I guess it is a vocational hazard.

On the job, we conduct inspections to prevent the loss of life, property and livelihoods-- case in point: Golden City Chinese Restaurant. A few months ago, Golden City Chinese Restaurant was issued a Notice and Order to make repairs to their Type 1 kitchen hood and replace the obsolete hood fire suppression system. The restaurant would not be allowed to open back up until the kitchen hood was brought into compliance. The owner of the restaurant was not happy to say the least. The repairs cost money and being closed cost money.

Recently, we responded to a fire at the Golden City Chinese Restaurant. Someone left a burner on under a large kettle throughout the night. Eventually a fire started on the stove. The fire suppression system did its job and slowed the fire until we were able to get there. I believe that the restaurant would not be standing if the old, out-of-date hood system was still in place. But the restaurant is still there and will continue to do business because we insisted the fire code violations found during an inspection were corrected.

Fire and life safety inspections are not about catching businesses getting it wrong. They are about helping business get it right and stay in business and protect their employees, customers and investments. Inspections also mitigate conditions that would be hazardous to responding firefighters.

So the next time you see one of the members of the Fire and Life Safety Division give him a hug.
On August 4 Golden Fire Department was dispatched to a three vehicle crash involving a Horizon Coach Lines bus, a Ford Explorer and a Chevy Impala. Upon arrival crews found three vehicles with heavy damage. The driver in the Ford Explorer received fatal injuries. One victim suffered moderate injuries. There were 41 people on the bus and eight claimed to have injuries. All injured parties were transported to the hospital via AMR Ambulance and West Metro Fire medic units. After the scene was secured all units were cleared and return to quarters.

Near Miss at Lions Park

On August 16 Golden Fire Department was dispatched to a motor vehicle that had crashed in Lions Park. This vehicle went from the Community Center Parking lot into Lions Park hitting two trees and then coming to rest after striking and wedging itself on top of one of the stationary barbecue grills. Crews assessed the patient and determined that the victim was uninjured. All hazards were mitigated and all companies returned to service. If not stopped, there the vehicle was headed for the playground area where there were about 30 kids and adults enjoying the park about 1040 hours. Something to think about.
Climber Injured on North Table Mountain

In the evening of July 23, Golden Fire Department was dispatched to North Table Mountain on the report of a climber who had been struck by a rock and was injured. Upon arrival, crews found the patient with potential spinal injuries and determined it was going to be a technical rescue to remove her from where she was climbing. Due to the extent of the patient’s injuries and the fact that a carry out operation was going to be timely, it was determined the fastest way to transport the patient to the hospital was to land the Flight for Life helicopter on the top of the Mesa. The patient was removed from the cliff and carried to the top of North Table Mountain for air transportation to the hospital. All units cleared.

Mutual Aid Requested for the Black Forest Fire in Colorado Springs

On June 12 GFD Engine 25, with four personnel responded with the West Task Force to the Black Forest Fire near Colorado Springs. Their task was to perform structural defense triage of a certain area in the fire zone. After more than 12 hours, the Golden crew was released by command and they returned to Golden.

Food Vendor Mobile Structure at the Farmers Market Catches Fire

On August 3, GFD was dispatched to the Golden Farmers Market for a smoke investigation. Upon arrival Battalion 22 determined that no flames were showing, however, it was obvious from the smoke conditions that there were combustible materials smoldering. Engine 21 arrived on scene and advanced a hose line to support crews from Rescue 21. The smoldering materials were extinguished, the structure was overhauled and all units cleared the scene. The fire was determined to be unintentional.
7/21/2013: Approximately 10:00 AM Golden Fire was dispatched to a report of a vehicle in the water at Mile Marker 269 on U.S. Highway 6 in Clear Creek Canyon. Upon arrival it was determined there were three people in the water. Two occupants from the vehicle and a bystander had to be rescued and brought to the shore side. Mutual aid was requested from West Metro. All three people were safely removed from the vehicle and the water. Two occupants were transported by ambulance with various injuries. One patient was in serious condition.
Chemical suicide, also known as detergent suicide, is an increasingly common method of committing suicide. It is often communicated as an easy, quick and painless way to end one’s life. The technique originated in Japan but has been spreading across the United States via instructions posted on the Internet. Chemical suicide involves mixing two or more inexpensive, common household chemicals in an enclosed space. The chemical mixtures produce a heat-releasing — or exothermic — reaction and create toxic gases that quickly fill an enclosed area.

Chemical suicides typically occur in personal vehicles, closets, bathrooms and other small, confined spaces where the concentration of gas can quickly accumulate to levels that are lethal not only to suicide victims but also to emergency responders. To prevent injury or death to emergency responders reporting to chemical suicides, it is essential to conduct a careful and detailed scene assessment and patient size-up in any situation involving an unresponsive person in an enclosed space.

Below are key indicators of potential chemical or detergent suicide scenes:

- Unresponsive subject inside the vehicle. Subject committing suicide with the proper chemical mixtures will be dead instantly. Subject may have a seatbelt fastened to prevent his or her body from falling onto the horn and alerting others.
- Subject wearing goggles or gloves to prevent chemical burns before his or her death.
- Warning signs (such as HAZMAT or SUICIDE) taped to the window or door of a vehicle or room.
- Yellow/Green or white residue on a vehicle’s seats or dashboard. This residue has been found in almost all chemical suicide cases.
- Windows fogged or tinted with yellow/green residue.
- Pennies in the vehicle or vehicle console area will be tarnished with residue.
- Smell of rotten eggs or sulfur, indicating the presence of hydrogen sulfide.
- Smell of bitter or burnt almonds, indicating the presence of hydrogen cyanide.
- Empty household cleaning containers on the floorboard or seat of a vehicle.
- One or more large buckets visible.
- Vehicle’s inside door handles removed, which prevents a subject who has changed his or her mind from stopping the suicide process.
- Duct tape, plastic or towels to cover air vents, windows and doors. This prevents the deadly chemical mixture from seeping out.

For archived downloads, go to: www.usfa.fema.gov/nfa/coffee-break/
WANTED
Golden Fire Department Retirees to Attend Old-timers Night

When: Saturday, September 14, 2013
Where: Golden Hotel
800 11 Street
Golden, CO 80401
Time: Social Hour 4 PM-5 PM (Cash Bar)
Dinner 5 PM-8 PM

Menu Choices:
Top Sirloin, Chicken Saltimbocca
Grilled Salmon, Vegetable Napoleon

RSVP to Engineer Matt Finley 303-880-1265
by August 31 with your menu choice.

Please Note: If you need assistance with in town transportation or have special diet requirements, please let Matt know when you RSVP.
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September 2013
On July 20, the Golden Fire Department performed live fire training scenarios at the West Metro Training Center. Pictured above from left to right; also known as the Wolfpack, Cody Kalb, Daniel Watters and Tim Hinkle.